As Putin threatens his military might against Ukraine, many see him in total control of the narrative. Others caution that he may have underestimated the West’s response. With the exception of Germany, most of the NATO alliance is united, and the US presence in Eastern Europe has increased. Perhaps that was always part of his masterplan: to create a perceived “threat” to justify intervention.
But the risks of attacking Ukraine are great, not only to his vision of a restored “Greater Russia,” but to the leader himself. Could Putin go the way of Rasputin?
That mystical monk achieved a strange hold over the last tsarina, in fact exercising a sort of absolute control over an absolute monarchy. But in the end, some nobles decided enough was enough, and did him in.
Putin has secured his absolute control by cultivating and coopting a bunch of oligarchs and other flunkies, maintaining a grip on the military and security forces, and destroying civil society and any other form of opposition.
But such forms of control are a two-way street. When he stole the 2012 election and brutally crushed the popular response, he undermined any illusion of legitimacy, becoming more and more dependent on these elites. He is not their puppet. But if they turn on him, he has nowhere else to go.
Already, these groups see their leader’s Ukrainian posturing has not produced the expected result. If he does go through with a full-scale invasion, things will go from bad to worse fairly quickly.
Yes, Russia can overrun the Ukraine easily, and perhaps even install a “friendly” government. That’s the end of the good news. Western sanctions will hit the Russian economy hard, and will certainly target the oligarchs.
For the military, the invasion will be costly, and occupying Ukraine will turn into a version of Afghanistan. Sabotage and rear-guard actions will become the norm, prompting ever more severe responses. But the greatest threat will be the popular reaction—endless demonstrations against the invaders and their installed stodges.
How harshly can the Russian military and security forces react? This will only produce more popular opposition. And what will the impact be on the Russian troops themselves, to fire indiscriminately on their supposed Ukrainian compatriots? And how might these scenes energize the populations in Belarus, already dismayed by their own false government’s reliance on Russian support?
Ultimately, the impact on the home front may prove decisive. As the body bags come home, and the Russian public comes to recognize their noble warriors have not been welcomed as liberators but brutal invaders, the heroic myths will start to unravel. Combined with an unraveling economy and no ready end to the conflict, opposition may grow through a much broader segment of society. Protests in solidarity with the Ukrainians and Belarusians will spread.
Putin will, of course, unleash his “usual suspects” to deal with these popular uprisings. But how will they ultimately respond? The oligarchs can no longer prosper under Putin, the army faces another humiliating defeat, and the security forces will realize their power to suppress is waning (and may start to fear the fate of the Stasi).
Perhaps, they will think, it is time to depose our failing leader. And then? Who knows.